43 Control: 13844 Action Rec'd: OCTOBER 23, 1961 EIR

FROM: PARIS Info

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7°25 a.m.

SS TO: Secretary of State G

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NO: POLTO CIRCULAR 28, OCTOBER 20, 9:00 P.M. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

PASS DEFENSE

E. Atti

POUCHED INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS

THIS IS INTERIM EVALUATION OF MILITARY BUILDUP OF NATO

ALLIANCE RE BERLIN CRISTS. THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN DEVELOPED IN CONSULTATION WITH GENERAL NORSTAD, WHO CONCURS IN THE ESTIMATE OF THE BUILDUP. GENERALLY SPEAKING,

WE CONSIDER THAT THE ALLIANCE'S RESPONSE TO AUG 8PROPOSALS OF SECRETARY RUSK HAVE BEEN FORTHCOMING, CON-

STRUCTIVE, AND SHOULD NOT BE DISCOUNTED. OF COURSE. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF FURTHER THINGS TO BE DONE

AND I SHALL DISCUSS THESE LATER IN THIS MESSAGE. BUT LET ME GO INTO THE ACTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN TAKEN WITHOUT GETTING

INTO TECHNICAL DETAILS.

IT IS NOW SOME TWO MONTHS SINCE ORIGINAL PROPOSALS WERE MADE BY US ON BEHALF OF FOUR POWERS, AND FOR THE MOST PART ACTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN WHILE PARLIAMENTS HAVE BEEN OUT OF SESSION AND HAVE THEREFORE BEEN LIMITED BY THAT FACTOR. IN 'ADDITION, PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN PURSUED NOTWITHSTANDING NTHOHTE * PRESS SPECULATION OF UNDUE OPTIMISM FOLLOWING RUSK-GROMYKO TALKS, AND DESPITE CLEVER SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO CONVEY TO EUROPEAN OPINION THAT BERLIN CRISIS CAN BE SETTLED BY NEGOTIATION, SUCH AS INVITATION TO SPAAK, ETC. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, FOLLOWING IS BROAD BRUSH BOXSCORE AS WE SEE IT.

OUR AUG 8 PRESENTATION AND US POLICY HAVE GIVEN HIGHEST PRIORITY OF COURSE TO BUILDUP IN THE CENTER, AND IT IS

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-cecnet

-2- POLTO CIRCULAR 28, OCTOBER 20, 9:00 P.M. (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM PARIS.

IT IS HERE THAT I THINK THE NATO RECORD IS REASONABLY FINCOURAGING. THE FRENCH ARE IMPROVING THEIR GROUND FORCE AND AIR FORCE POSTURE IN EUROPE, ALTHOUGH OF COURSE THEIR ALGERIAN RESPONSIBILITIES CONTINUE TO HOLD HIGHEST PRIORITY. THEY HAVE BEEN COOPERATIVE WITH REGARD TO US LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS IN FRANCE. GERMANY HAS ANNOUNCED A PROGRAM WHICH, IF FULLY IMPLEMENTED ONCE A GOVERNMENT IS FORMED, WILL, AS NORSTAD SAYS, TAKE THEM ABOUT AS FAR AS THEY CAN GO IN THE ABSENCE OF MOBILIZATION. I WISH THAT THE REMAINING MEMBER OF THE FOUR POWERS HAD DONE AS WELL, BUT THE UK PROGRAM ADDS VERY LITTLE NEW, AND THERE IS MUCH THAT THE UK SHOULD BE DOING. BRUCE'S SEARCHING ANALYSES OF THE UK POLITICAL CLIMATE AND THEIR RELUCTANCE TO RE-ESTABLISH SOME FORM OF NATIONAL SERVICE PROVIDE AN EXPLANATION. NEVERTHELESS, THE UK HAS NOT SET A GOOD EXAMPLE FOR THE SMALLER MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE. THIS IS A MATTER WHICH CAN ONLY BE SETTLED ON APPROACH TO THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN THE UK. IF A BETTER RESULT WERE ACHIEVED, THIS WOULD, I AM SURE, HAVE A REAL EFFECT UPON THE EFFORT OF THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE, FOR A NUMBER OF THE ALLIES WOULD TAKE A STERNER ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF THE BRITISH AS HIGHLY INDICATIVE OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION, WHILE AT PRESENT THEY INTERPRET BRITISH INACTION AS JUSTIFYING A MORE OPTIMISTIC INTERPRETATION OF THE NEEDS OF THE MOMENT. THE NETHERLANDS, WHICH HAD BEEN UNABLE TO OBTAIN A BUDGET INCREASE SUFFICIENTLY LARGE TO COMPENSATE FOR DECLINE IN US MAP SUPPORT, HAS NOW BEEN ABLE TO DO SO, AND MAY BE ABLE TO SECURE STILL FURTHER FUNDS. IN ADDITION TO BEING MORE SELF-SUSTAINING, THE DUTCH ARMED FORCES HAVE BEEN PUT IN AN ADVANCED STATE OF READINESS AND THE FIRST STEP TOWARD FORWARD DEPLOYMENT HAS BEEN TAKEN, I.E., ONE BRIGADE GROUP IS NOW MOVING TO GERMANY. CANADA IS FLESHING OUT ITS GROUND AND AIR FORCES AND INCREASING THEIR EFFECTIVENESS. IN ADDITION, ITALY HAS INCREASED

seéder.

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HAS INCREASED ITS MILITARY PERSONNEL, OBTAINING THE NEEDED ADDITIONAL FUNDS WITHOUT HAVING TO GO TO PARLIAMENT, AND WE HOPE THAT THE EXAMPLE OF ADDITIONAL SPENDING RESULTING THEREFROM MAY HAVE AN EFFECT ON OTHER CAPITALS.

GENERAL NORSTAD'S EVALUATION THAT INSTEAD OF ROUGHLY THE EQUIVALENT OF 16 COMBAT-READY DIVISIONS IN THE CENTER, WE WILL HAVE BY THE END OF THE YEAR APPROXIMATELY 24 COMBAT DIVISIONS (EXCLUSIVE OF ANY ADDITIONAL PROJECTED OR PLANNED US UNITS), MOST OF WHICH WILL BE MANNED TO EFFECTIVE STRENGTH, SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. AIR EFFECTIVENESS WILL ALSO BE IMPROVED, INCLUDING NOT ONLY THE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT WE HAVE BUT THE MANNING OF WARNING SYSTEMS, ETC.

NORWAY, DENMARK, BELGIUM AND PORTUGAL LEAVE A GOOD DEAL TO BE DESIRED, BUT THIS IS NOT SURRRISING. GIVEN PORTUGUESE PREOCCUPATION WITH THE ANGOLA SITUATION AND THE EXTENSIVE REFORMS SHE IS INSTITUTING THERE IT IS PROBABLY IN OUR INTERESTS THAT SHE GIVES HIGHEST PRIORITY TO SUCH, MATTERS. BELGIUM'S DISAPPOINTING RECORD IS LARGELY DUE TO HER UPSET FINANCIAL SITUATION AND AS AN AFTERMATH OF THE CONGO, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SEVERAL STEPS SHE COULD AND SHOULD TAKE WITHOUT DAMAGING HER FINANCES. DENMARK CONTINUES ITS FRANKLY UNSATISFACTORY RECORD OF DEFENSE BUILDUP, BUT ONE WOULD HAVE EXPECTED THAT DENMARK WOULD PROBABLY HAVE BEEN THE LAST TO INCREASE ITS DEFENSE BUDGET. NORWAY HAS APPROPRIATED 40 MILLION KRONER AND HAS GONE FAIRLY FAR TOWARDS DOING A NUMBER OF THE THINGS THAT NEED DOING WITHOUT REALLY MOVING TO MOBILIZATION.

GREECE AND TURKEY GENERALLY ARE PREPARED TO BUILD THAT DEGREE OF ARMED FORCES THAT US IS WILLING TO SUPPORT WITH MAP, AND PARTICULARLY GREECE, DESPITE THOSE LIMITATIONS, IS MAKING GOOD ADDITIONAL DEMONSTRATION WITHIN ITS PRESENT CAPABILITIES.

FINLETTER

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Department of State

E., SECRE?

43 Action

Control: 13352

Rec'd:

EIR

NO:

OCTOBER 23, 1961 7.25 a.m.

Info

FROM: PARIS

SS G SP SA

TO: Secretary of State

L H SB POLTO CIRCULAR 28, OCTOBER 21, MIDNIGHT (SECTION TWO OF TWO).

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"I HAVE REVIEWED THE TELS COMING IN FROM VARIOUS POSTS ...ABOUT WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE AND I AGREE THAT WE HAVE A GOOD DEAL OF WORK AHEAD OF US. IT WOULD BE EASIER IF WE WERE TO MAKE THIS A COLLABORATIVE WORK, SUPPORTING WITH SOME EQUIPMENT ASSISTANCE (A SMALL EXPENSE COMPARED TO THE LARGE US BUILDUP AND ONE WHICH WOULD GIVE RESULTS MUCH MORE QUICKLY AND CHEAPLY) THE EFFORTS OF OUR ALLIES TO CARRY THEIR SHARE.

RMR

WHAT CAN WE BEST DO IN THE NAC TO FOLLOW UP ON THE BERLIN BUILDUP? I DO NOT WISH TO SUGGEST THAT THIS IS GOING TO BE EASY. THE PROSPECT OF NEGOTIATIONS, IN VIEW OF KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECH TO THE PARTY CONGRESS, MAY CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE OF "WAIT AND SEE" DESPITE THE FACT THAT THERE IS NO SIGN OF SUB-STANTIVE CHANGE IN THE VERY TOUGH SOVIET POSITION. WILL DO MY BEST TO COPE WITH THIS AND TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE REKINDLE THE RECOGNITION OF THE NEED TO DO MORE IN THE MILITARY AREA. I THINK WE WILL ALSO HAVE TO SEEK TO OBTAIN RECOGNITION OF THE FACT THAT THE BERLIN CRISIS MAY WELL STRETCH OUT BEYOND THE END OF THE YEAR, AND SEEK TO FOCUS ON MAINTAINING THE EXTRA BERLIN BUILDUP THAT HAS BEEN PLEDGED FOR AS LONG AS NEEDS BE, SINCE CERTAINLY ANY RETROGRADE MOVE ON THE WEST'S PART DURING THE CRISIS WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE. I WOULD HOPE FOR SOME DEGREE OF IMPETUS ONCE THE COUNCIL IS BRIEFED ON THE NATO ASPECTS OF MILITARY CONTINGENCY PLANS. ANOTHER HELPFUL STEP WOULD BE IF LONGER TERM NATO PLANNING REQ-UIREMENTS COULD BE ESTABLISHED PROMPTLY.

NOW THAT

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NOW THAT THE "PROSPECT" OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS HAS BEEN "INFLATED" BY KHRUSHCHEY, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT SPEEDILY TO IMPROVE THE NATURE AND DEPTH OF OUR CON-SULTATION ON THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF A BERLIN SETTLEMENT. WITHOUT FURTHER APPRECIATION THAN HAS BEEN GIVEN THEM SO FAR OF THE COURSE OF ACTION THAT WILL BE FOLLOWED BY THE THREE NEGOTIATING POWERS, IT WILL BE INCREASINGLY DIFF-ICULT FOR THE OTHER MEMBERS OF NATO TO OBTAIN PARLIAMEN-TARY SUPPORT FOR THE MILITARY BUILDUP. THE GOVERNMENTS OF OUR ALLIES NEED TO BE IN POSITION TO LEAD THEIR PUBLIC OPINION TO BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT ALL REASONABLE EFFORTS WILL BE MADE TO SOLVE THE DISPUTE PEACEFULLY, AND IT IS TO BE EXPECTED THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO PERMIT THEM TO SAY JUST THAT, AND TO EVALUATE THE SERIOUS CHANCES THAT NEGOTIATIONS MAY NOT PRODUCE A SOLUTION, WE WILL HAVE REAL DIFFICULTIES IN OBTAINING FURTHER MILITARY INCREASES. IN OTHER WORDS, WE CANNOT EXPECT OUR ALLIES TO COME UP WITH THE SAME EVAL-UATION OF THE RISKS AND THE NEEDS OF THE SITUATION THAT WE HAVE IF WE DO NOT SHARE OUR THINKING WITH THEM.

I THINK THAT THE MOST FRUITFUL THING FOR THE COUNCIL TO DO IS TO FOCUS ON (1) ATTAINMENT OF ITS END-61 SPECIAL PROGRAMS FOR BERLIN, AND (2) TO START GROUNDWORK OF THE END-62 PROGRAMS, AND TO SEE WHETHER WE CANNOT GET STIKKER AND THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF TO FOCUS ON PERHAPS SOME SERIES OF QUESTIONNARIES WHICH WILL LEAD TO EVOKING FURTHER EFFORTS.

IN ADDITION, I AM PRIVATELY TAKING UP THE PROBLEM WITH VARIOUS PERMREPS SO THAT WE WILL BE EXERTING CONTINUING PRESSURE AND SEARCHING FOR WAYS AND APPROACHES THAT COULD BRING ABOUT ADDITIONAL RESULTS. I WILL OF COURSE KEEP IN TOUCH WITH NORSTAD.

FINLETTER

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